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The Erosion of Southern Europe's Middle Classes: Debt, insecurity 
and the political economy of austerity 
  
 
THEO PAPADOPOULOS and ANTONIOS ROUMPAKIS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Our article examines the position of middle classes in the social reproduction of southern European (SE) 
political economies in light of the sovereign debt crisis. The first part analyzes the rise of SE middle classes in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The second part discusses the transformation of SE political economies after their entry in 
the European Monetary Union. The third part explores how the austerity measures adopted as a response to the 
sovereign debt crisis contributed to the further undermining of SE middle classes’ income and employment 
security. We discuss how the new European economic governance challenges the politico-economic foundations 
of SE political economies by transforming them into de-facto ‘consolidation states’ (Streeck, 2013). Using EU-
SILC data on disposable income we also demonstrate the differential impact of austerity measures. The erosion 
of SE middle classes accelerated post-crisis; however, the speed and depth of this erosion and its political fallout 
are not uniform.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The eruption of the global financial crisis and, subsequently, the sovereign debt crisis has generated a large 
number of empirical studies on how middle classes are faring in Europe and elsewhere, including southern 
Europe (Kochhar, 2017; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016; OECD, 2015; Thewissen, 2015; Gornick and Jäntti, 2014; 
Dallinger, 2013; Bigot, 2012, 2011). Key themes in these studies are the long-term effects of rising income 
inequalities and increasing job polarization and, to a lesser extent, the negative impact of austerity and structural 
reforms upon their economic position. What has attracted less attention is how these developments have affected 
the middle classes’1 role in the reproduction of southern European welfare capitalisms (for an exception see 
Petmesidou 2011); a role that was pivotal in the regimes’ democratic legitimation and their integration in the 
European Union (Chilcote et al, 1990; Magone, 2003).  
                                                          
1 There is a very wide range of approaches to defining and operationalizing ‘middle class’: income-based, 
wealth-based, occupation-based and perceptually/subjectively-based (for reviews see Vaughan-Whitehead et al., 
2016; Atkisnon and Brandolini, 2013; Banerjee, and Duflo, 2008). Their discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, to indicate the size of middle class we adopted Bigot and Müller’s (2011:3) income-based 
definition: households with income between 70% and 150% of median adjusted household income. In terms of 
occupations we adopted Petmesidou’s list of middle class socio-professional groups: “self-employed 
professionals, small business owners and craftspeople […] white-collar workers in the private sector, sales 
personnel and service workers as well as civil servants [and employees in public enterprises]” (Petmesidou,  
1998: 116).  
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Our article aims to contribute to this discussion. It is structured in three parts. The first part reviews the rise 
of middle classes in southern Europe in the context of the region’s post-World War II politico-economic 
development, and its democratic consolidation in the context of European integration. The second part critically 
engages with Streeck’s (2013) assertion of the rise of ‘debt states’ in Europe, in the light of southern Europe’s 
incorporation into the European Monetary Union (EMU), and explores the significance of the rise of private 
debt prior to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. The third part discusses how the fiscal consolidation 
measures imposed by European and international lenders in the aftermath of the crisis contributed to the further 
erosion of middle classes. We discuss how the institutions and practices of the new European economic 
governance undermine the traditional politico-economic foundations of southern European welfare capitalisms 
by transforming into ‘consolidation states’ (Streeck, 2013). Using income data from EU-SILC (European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) surveys we also demonstrate the differential impact of austerity 
measures across the income distribution and explore its variation between and within southern European 
countries. We conclude that the combined effects of these transformations have led to a deep, but not uniform, 
erosion of south European middle classes which, politically, is manifested as a crisis of democratic 
representation.  
 
 
2. Democratic consolidation, European integration and the rise of middle classes 
in southern Europe  
 
The term Southern Europe began to proliferate in the academic literature2 in the early 1970s (Malefakis, 
1992). According to Payne (1986) the term offered ‘a useful comparative frame of reference for understanding 
common features of modernization in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal’, countries which ‘underwent similar 
changes along the path to political development and economic modernization, particularly in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries’ (p.108). For the purposes of our article we focus on approaches and evidence that 
help us contextualize the post-World War II rise of middle classes in southern Europe until the region’s 
incorporation into the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
According to Streeck (2013) the emergence and growth of the middle class in the western world was 
inexorably linked to the creation of democratic welfare capitalisms, during the post-World War II period. It took 
place within the institutional context of what Streeck characterized as the post-war ‘tax state’: a term he adopted 
from Schumpeter to describe a form of capitalist nation-state ‘predicated on the conciliation of market 
competition with the entitlements granted by the outcome of democratic elections and collective bargaining 
between organized labor and capital owners’ (Feher, 2016:1). However, this state form and its corresponding 
social structure bear little resemblance to those that predominated in southern Europe during the post-World 
War II period. Drawing on Sappeli’s work (1996), Rhodes described the postwar politico-economic milieu of 
the region as characterized by “late industrialization coupled with a state that was as interventionist as it was 
administratively weak [with] a low degree of political institutionalization, together with the disintegrating 
consequences of clientship” (Rhodes, 2015: 52). Against this backdrop, we argue that there are at least three 
fundamental differences in the post-war emergence of middle classes between southern and north-western 
welfare capitalisms in Europe.  
 
First, southern Europe was originally integrated in the world economy as a set of semi-peripheral economies 
(for a critical review see Chilcote and Johnson, 1983; Chilcote, 1984; Chilcote et al, 1990) and, later, as a set of 
peripheral economies in the European economy (Simonazzi and Ginzburg, 2015). Historically, their 
competitiveness was based largely on the pursuit of low labor-costs while productivity was comparatively low 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013; Rangone and Solari, 2012). With the notable exceptions of Catalonia and 
the northern regions in Spain and Italy, the industrialization process was weak and rapid. Italy as a ‘latecomer’, 
and Spain, Portugal and Greece as ‘late-latecomers’ integrated as a periphery in a European economy already 
dominated by the ‘first-comer industrializers’ of the ‘centre’ (Simonazzi and Ginzburg, 2015: 106). By the early 
                                                          
2 For an extensive review of southern Europe’s discursive construction in historiography and social sciences 
up to the years prior to the sovereign debt crisis see Baumeister and Sala (2015: 21). 
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1990s - approximately a decade after the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the European Economic 
Community - industrialization in southern Europe reached its peak (Table 1). Over the same period (1960-1990) 
employment declined in agriculture and expanded in the services’ sector in equally spectacular pace. By the 
beginning of 21st century, southern European societies were completing their transition towards post-industrial 
socio-economic structures with services as the dominant sector of their economies (Table 1).  
Table 1: Employment by activity (% of total employment) and self-employment in southern Europe, 1960-2015 
 
  
1960-68 1968-73 1981 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Italy 
        
 
Agriculture  28 20 13 9 5 4 4 
 
Industry  36 39 37 32 32 29 27 
 
Services  40 40 50 59 63 68 70 
Greece 
        
 
Agriculture  52 40 31 24 17 12 13 
 
Industry  20 25 29 26 23 20 15 
 
Services  28 34 40 50 60 68 72 
Spain 
        
 
Agriculture  33 27 19 12 7 4 4 
 
Industry  33 36 35 34 31 23 20 
 
Services  34 38 46 55 62 73 76 
Portugal 
        
 
Agriculture  39 30 26 18 13 11 8 
 
Industry  32 33 37 34 34 27 24 
 
Services  28 37 37 48 53 62 68 
 
Source: Employment activity 1960-1973 data from Simonazzi and Ginzburg (2015: 110). Employment 
activity 1981-2015 data from World Bank (2017).  
 
These rapid changes in the composition of economy and employment were accompanied by a similarly rapid 
process of urbanization, as internal migration from rural to urban areas accelerated. Between 1960 and 2010, 
urban populations in southern Europe as percentage of total population increased from 56% to 76% in Greece, 
from 59% to 68% in Italy, from 57% to 76% in Spain, and from 35% to 61% in Portugal (World Bank, 2017). 
Apart from their economic significance these processes had important cultural significance. According to 
Sapelli (1995:20), their rapidity contributed to the continuation of ‘anthropological relationships typical of rural 
societies’, allowing practices such as familial solidarity, reciprocity but also paternalism to continue.  
 
Second, in southern Europe the state and, especially, the welfare system were used as sites of political 
patronage, under conditions of authoritarian rule or outright dictatorship. This was starkly different to the 
postwar experience of the rest of European welfare capitalisms, where, under conditions of representative 
democracy, social and employment rights gradually expanded to cover nearly all citizens. As southern European 
social security systems were predominantly organized along the Bismarckian principle of social insurance, those 
in full- time uninterrupted employment or those in protected professions were differentially privileged. Often, 
citizens of left political orientation or those with ‘questionable’ nationalistic credentials were excluded 
altogether (Petmesidou, 1991, 1996; Ferrera, 1996; Mingione, 1995). Moreover, in seeking electoral support 
and/or legitimation, successive administrations, authoritarian and democratic, resorted in exercising positive 
discretion - e.g. granting selectively rights and privileges to politically strong socio-occupational groups - or 
negative discretion - e.g. tolerating tax evasion practices. As a result, fragmented, fragile and unequal social 
security systems and ineffective tax systems became common institutional features of southern European 
welfare regimes (Petmesidou 1991; Rhodes, 1997).  
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Against this background, we maintain that the rise of middle class strata in southern Europe was only 
minimally associated with capitalist expansion, a ’tax state’, or the achievements of organized labor under 
conditions of democratic capitalism. It had more to do with the postwar expansion of a particular type of 
interventionist state that was weak in terms of the political impartiality of its bureaucracy (Sotiropoulos, 2004), 
feeble in its commitment to universal welfare and open to the influence of the particularistic interests of 
powerful socio-professional groups. As Petmesidou (2011) put it, ‘the sociohistorical constitution of the middle 
classes’ across southern Europe shares many similarities:   
 
In this region, late industrialization, a record of authoritarian regimes (and/or political instability) 
until late in the postwar period, and a configuration of rent-seeking statist-clientelistic practices of 
varying prevalence across the region scarcely favoured a politics of solidarity on collective welfare. 
[…] [A] social construction of problems in ‘individualist’ terms kept fragmentation in social protection 
high and supported a social exclusion risk-profile based on differential access to political credentials 
that allowed individuals, households and enterprises to benefit from the rent-yielding state 
mechanisms.  
Petmesidou (2011: 225) 
 
Italy aside, it was the post-dictatorship processes of democratic transition and consolidation in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal (Chilcote et al, 1990), and especially their accession to the European Economic Community in the 
1980s that marked the beginning of the era of democratic welfare capitalism in southern Europe; not least, by 
making available resources for redistribution in the form of European subsidies and related programmes 
(Petmesidou, 2011:225; Magone, 2003:13). In this context, the emergence, original composition, and expansion 
of south European middle classes involved the inclusion of a wider range of socio-professional strata that began 
accruing social rights and welfare entitlements in clientelistic political environments but under conditions of 
democratization enhanced by the processes of European integration at the time (see also Ferrera, 2007). The 
result was a remarkable social transformation that span a period of at least 40 years and brought about the 
creation of sizeable middle classes in all countries of the region. Based on an income-based estimate3 Bigot and 
Müller (2011:2) calculated that by 2009 approximately 51% of households in Italy, 50% in Greece, 48% in 
Portugal and 48% in Spain could be classified as belonging to the middle class, compared to an EU average of 
53%.    
 
This transformation is also empirically captured in the substantial increase in social expenditure in southern 
Europe, one of the key indicators associated with the size of middle class (Bigot and Müller, 2011:9). Figure 1 
demonstrates that over the period 1980-2010 all social expenditures in southern European countries were 
increasing, on a convergence trajectory to the European average. This trend came to an abrupt end with the 
eruption of the sovereign crisis and the adoption of austerity measures that followed it, the details of which we 
explore later in the article.     
  
                                                          
3 Calculations based on data from EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Middle class members are 
considered ‘those persons living in a household whose disposable income per consumption unit is between 70 and 150% of 
the general population median. A consumption unit is defined as the square root of the number of persons living in the 
household’ (Bigot and Müller, 2011:3).  
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Figure 1. Social Expenditure as % of GDP in southern Europe and EU15, 
1980-2010 
 
 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure dataset 
 
The third fundamental difference between south European and north-western variants of welfare capitalisms 
concerns the dual role of the family in social reproduction (Bakker and Silvey, 2012). As a collective societal 
actor that pre-dates capitalist ‘modernization’ the family was integrated in southern European political 
economies in a dual capacity as both a welfare provider and a politico-economic agent. On the one hand, as 
Rangone and Solari (2012) demonstrated, employers in southern Europe have been traditionally reluctant to 
absorb social risks while socio-professional groups were highly averse to universalistic social policies. On the 
other hand, social insurance systems assumed a male breadwinner model of social reproduction. Employees in 
the formal labor market4 with uninterrupted, full time work biographies, like the (predominantly male) primary 
earners of households, enjoyed considerable levels of social protection that was often extended to the rest of 
family members. In the deeply familistic southern European welfare regime (Martin, 2015; Fererra, 2007, 1996; 
Karamessini, 2007; Moreno, 2006; Leitner, 2003; Triffileti, 1999; Petmesidou, 2011, 1991) middle classes 
experienced substantial inequalities in terms of access and levels of family benefits, childcare, unemployment 
support, healthcare and elderly care provision (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012; 2013). Moreover, in 
contrast to the Nordic welfare capitalisms and France, where social policies facilitated women’s participation to 
the labor market, or conservative welfare regimes, like in Germany and Austria, where welfare institutions 
‘recognised’ women as carers and/or wives (Trifiletti, 1999) social welfare policies in southern Europe were 
traditionally highly gendered and deeply patriarchal. Women were hardly being given support as carers by 
welfare institutions (see also Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 1990; Jimeno and Toharia, 1994) and, rather, were 
expected to act as the ‘compulsory altruists’ of their households (Symeonidou, 1996:80). As a result, with the 
exception of Portugal, female participation rates in southern Europe were historically low. When women entered 
the labor market, they did it in the same terms as men and often ended up working in the informal sector, 
especially in temporary and atypical employment.  
 
By deploying a distinct set of strategies in its relationship to both the state and the market the family became 
central in the functioning, and reproduction, of southern European welfare capitalisms. During the decades 
under review, the typical experience of southern European middle class households involved the primary 
earners of the family, usually the fathers, experiencing a relatively high degree of employment security but 
combined with a variegated access to social security rights which will extent to the rest of the (dependent) 
                                                          
4 Although these conditions reflect an ‘insider-outsider’ problem in South European labor markets they 
should also be considered as the only security that previous generations of workers earned within these 
particular employment regimes (Karamessini, 2007). 
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family members. Alternatively, unless they were self-employed, primary earners would most likely be involved 
in, predominantly, small or medium-sized businesses, often family-owned. Middle class households were also 
more likely to own outright their home, the latter representing not only the key pillar of their socio-economic 
security but the key site for the redistribution of material and emotional resources among family members (see 
Allen et al., 2004). In addition, evidence suggests that at least until the mid-nineties southern European middle-
class families employed strategies of low economic risk, avoiding over-exposure to debt (see Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis, 2015). Other common practices of middle class families would involve investing heavily on their 
children’s education, transferring financial resources and property to family members when they got married or 
mobilizing contacts for securing employment via the extensive family network, the primary earner’s 
professional network or via a politically motivated clientelistic exchange (see Sotiropoulos, 2004). Indeed, even 
after the transition to democracy, the social politics of southern Europe remained dominated by relationships of 
patronage and paternalism, a clientelistic type of electoral contract between the main political parties and the 
electorate (see also Hopkin, 2012). Votes were often used by families as resources for accessing politico-
economic favours while, in turn, favours were deployed as resources for legitimacy and ensuring voters’ loyalty 
by political elites.  
 
The next section discusses how the participation of southern European countries in the EMU challenged the 
sustainability of their political economies and demonstrates how the capacity of middle classes to pursue their 
traditional strategies came to be undermined in the years prior to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. 
  
 
3. Southern Europe and the European Monetary Union: indebted states with 
indebted middle classes 
 
Joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) was a critical juncture for the political economies of southern 
Europe. Social and economic policies began to be formulated within the EMU framework of (neoliberal) 
economic governance while capital mobility began empowering investors and businesses to use ‘exit threats’ 
across the EU. As the financialization of the economy was accelerating, low-interest rate credit became easily 
available by the, then, expanding banking sector to both states and households.  
 
According to Streeck (2013) extensive borrowing from international and domestic markets transformed western 
democratic capitalisms into ‘debt states’. This, however, was not a uniform experience in southern Europe. Italy 
and Greece5 had already high levels of public debt prior to joining the EMU while public debts in Portugal and 
Spain were comparatively low until the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008. What became a uniform 
experience was the households’ increasing reliance on credit, often sanctioned by banks and governments, 
which led to what Crouch (2009) defined as ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (see Figure 2). Indeed, following the 
adoption of Euro, economic growth in southern Europe, and primarily in Spain, Portugal and Greece, was 
maintained mainly by boosting domestic demand through consumption and investment in construction and real 
estate (Petmesidou, 2011). This was often seen as evidence of a ‘convergence’ process that allowed south 
European middle classes to utilize their access to credit to ‘catch-up’ with the living standards of other core 
European middle classes (for a critical review of data see Vaughan-Whitehead et al., 2016). However, as 
Scharpf (2013) shows, not only did the foundational politico-economic rationale behind the creation of the 
Eurozone discounted the causes of the structural and institutional differences between the south European 
periphery and the European core (especially Germany and France) but it also applied a uniform credit supply 
policy that further exacerbated these asymmetries. This allowed countries with more coordinated market 
economies, like Germany, to achieve substantial wage restraint and export goods with what was basically an 
undervalued currency, leaving southern European economies with substantially overvalued real exchange rates 
and increasing labor costs while exposing households and businesses to unprecedented levels of debt (see 
Copelovitch, 2016; Streeck, 2015, 2013; Scharpf, 2013).  
 
                                                          
5 However, contrary to the 2008 sovereign debt crisis the (high) Greek public debt in the early 1990s was 
denominated in Drachma and regulated under Greek Law, allowing governments more room for action. 
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We regard the growth of private debt, especially household and non-financial corporations’ debt, as essential 
in understanding the origins of the erosion of southern European middle classes (on the impact of debt on the 
middle class see Scott and Pressman, 2011; on the rise of ‘the new culture of indebtedness’ among European 
middle classes see Mau, 2015:65-72). Figure 2 presents trends in the volume of household debt as % of GDP in 
all south European countries and Germany, during the period 1998-2016. Following the adoption of the Euro, 
household debt increased steeply in Greece, Spain and Portugal and more moderately in Italy (sees Figure 2). It 
appears that southern European households began replacing their strategies of low economic risk with those of 
high economic risk, utilizing credit and market means for consumption and investment. In particular, Greek 
households’ exposure to debt witnessed its most rapid increase during the period 2000-2008 at the staggering 
rate of 559% while the exposure of Italian households followed at almost 200%. Spanish and Portuguese 
households, already exposed to higher levels of private debt prior to the adoption of Euro, witnessed their debt 
rate increasing by 156% and 141% respectively. Over the period 1998-2016, Portugal remained the country with 
the most indebted households in southern Europe. Trends in Germany, used here as a reference country, 
highlight that the pressure to seek credit to maintain, or improve, living standards was not uniform across the 
EU. In fact, although debt exposure of German households in 1998 was much higher than in southern Europe, 
this exposure steadily declined and, by 2016, was well below the levels of Portugal, Spain and Greece. It is also 
worth highlighting that the increase in debt exposure coincided with the significant drop of household saving 
rates over the period 1998-2008, indicative of the pressures that households found themselves in the period prior 
to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. According to OECD data, by 2007, savings as percentage of net 
disposable income was halved in Italy and had collapsed to negative figures in Portugal, Spain and Greece 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, forthcoming). 
 
Figure 2. Household Debt (% GDP) in southern Europe and Germany, 1998-2016 
 
 
Note: Data refer to households and non-profit institutions  
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2017) 
 
 
Figure 3 presents data on non-financial corporation debt during the period 1998-2016. Evidently, south 
European non-financial businesses (mainly small and medium-sized enterprises) increased their exposure to 
credit to finance their investments and maintain their economic competitiveness. Exposure to credit increased 
more rapidly in Spain and Greece, partly to sustain housing and real estate construction activities. Portugal 
records the highest rates of non-financial corporate debt, even after the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, 
while Italy displays the second lowest debt exposure in southern Europe, partly a reflection of a stronger export 
sector that was able to access capital without resorting to excessive lending (Quaglia and Royo, 2015). Once 
more, when we compare how southern European non-financial businesses fared against their German 
counterparts it is evident that, since the adoption of Euro, German firms have been far more effective at 
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reducing their debt exposure while maintaining their competitiveness within European and global markets 
(Collignon and Esposito, 2014).  
 
Figure 3. Non-Financial Corporations Debt (% GDP) GDP in southern Europe and Germany, 
1998-2016. 
 
 
Note: Data refer to non-financial corporations, all sectors, market value, adjusted for breaks. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2017) 
 
The EMU convergence criteria and the introduction of the Euro were the first attempts to ‘constitutionalize’ 
the neoliberal economic rationale in the process of European integration (Gill, 2016). They provided the 
institutional and discursive environment for neo-liberal reforms in the fields of labor market protection, wage 
policies and welfare provision across all the Eurozone countries. Still, up until the sovereign debt crisis erupted, 
many of the attempted reforms in southern Europe have met the strenuous opposition, especially in Italy and 
Greece (Ferrera, 2005). As can be seen in Table 2, during the period 1992-2008, employment protection for 
those on regular and permanent employment remained more or less intact (with the exception of Spanish labor 
reforms in 1994). The majority of reforms during this period targeted employment protection for workers in 
temporary contracts. It is important to note here that south European economies were already creating 
significant numbers of precarious and informal jobs over this period (often filled by migrant laborers) prior to 
any pressures for labor market ‘deregulation’ (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012; Rangone and Solari, 2012). 
Therefore it can be reasonably assumed that prior to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis labor market 
reforms did not weaken significantly existing protections for the core labor force but, rather, opened up the way 
towards the formalization of precarious jobs in south European labor markets. 
 
Against this background, we maintain that prior to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis middle classes in 
south Europe became increasingly exposed to higher levels of debt as consumers and investors, and, as small 
business owners. While employment protection for the regularly employed (usually the primary household 
earners) survived the pressures for change, protection for temporary employment was substantially reduced.  
Participation in the EMU put the old certainties of southern European political economies under pressure. Next, 
we review how the policy responses to the sovereign debt crisis accelerated these pressures and further eroded 
the status and welfare of the middle classes that have traditionally sustained the familistic welfare capitalism of 
southern Europe.  
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Table 2: Employment Protection in southern Europe, 1992-2013 
 
 
 
Employment protection, 
individual and collective 
dismissals 
(regular contracts) 
Employment protection 
(temporary contracts) 
Greece    
  1992 2.80 4.75 
  2001 2.80 4.75 
  2008 2.80 2.75 
  2013 2.13 2.25 
Italy   
    1992 2.76 4.75 
  2001 2.76 3.25 
  2008 2.76 2.00 
  2013 2.68 2.00 
Portugal   
    1992 4.58 3.38 
  2001 4.58 2.81 
  2008 4.42 1.94 
  2013 3.18 1.81 
Spain 
    1992 3.55 3.75 
  2001 2.36 3.25 
  2008 2.36 3.00 
  2013 2.05 2.56 
   
  Note: Scale ranges from 0 (least protection) to 6 (most protection)   
Source: OECD Employment Protection Database, Version 1 
 
 
 
4. Fiscal consolidation, European integration and the erosion of middle classes in 
southern Europe  
 
The eruption of sovereign-debt crisis in 2009-10 and the measures taken in its aftermath placed quickly 
southern European political economies in a trajectory of rapid and deep transformation. The ‘bailout’ 
agreements for Greece and Portugal as well as the so-called ‘stand-by’ agreements for Italy and Spain, involved 
the imposition of drastic fiscal consolidation measures and far-reaching reductions in social welfare and 
employment protection by the ‘Troika’ of lenders (EC, IMF, ECB) (Sacchi, 2015;Theodoropoulou, 2015). Still, 
the pressures to institutionalize austerity and to deepen structural reforms in southern Europe - including the 
marketization of welfare and individualization of social risks (see Sciza, this volume) – were also part of a 
parallel transformation: the fundamental, re-configuration of European economic governance. For the first time, 
under the pretext of the crisis, EU bodies institutionalized their power to directly intervene in policy areas 
previously under the jurisdiction of national governments (on this point see Barbier, 2012).  
 
Two reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that took place in quick succession are of particular 
importance. First,  the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ agreement (December 2011), placed wage and collective bargaining 
agreements under an explicit system of monitoring of wage costs both in public and private sector. Under the 
discursive guise of improving the quality of economic coordination in the EU, wage policy is now explicitly 
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considered part of European economic governance (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2015); in fact, ‘the most 
important adjustment variable for promoting competitiveness’ (Busch et al., 2013, 8).  Under the second reform 
- the Fiscal Compact Treaty - that came into force on 1 January 2013, states’ budgets are required to be balanced 
or in surplus, with the rules having a permanent, almost constitutional, character (European Council, 2012).  
 
For authors like Gill (2016) these reforms epitomized the next phase in the constitutionalization of 
neoliberalism in the EU. For Streeck (2015), they are indicative of the European politico-economic elites’ 
attempt to facilitate the emergence of ‘consolidation states’6 in the EU, beginning with southern Europe. This is 
a new form of state that ‘has managed to institutionalize a political commitment and build a political capacity 
never to default on its debt, projecting an uncompromising determination to place its obligations to its creditors 
above all other obligations’ (Streeck, 2015: 11) 
 
The rise of ‘consolidation states’ in southern Europe necessitates fundamental changes in the mode of social 
reproduction of its political economies and the position of middle classes in them. Under conditions of 
diminishing national economic sovereignty, domestic political elites began to implement, in various degrees and 
speeds, fundamental changes in the role of the state, its functions and its politics. They are also pursuing drastic 
reductions in wages and pensions while radically altering the conditions of social and employment security via 
cutbacks in social expenditure and increases in taxation. Below, we examine in more detail the significance of 
these changes for southern European middle classes. 
 
4.1 Employment insecurity and the loss of middle class jobs  
 
Employment protection for both regular and temporary workers was substantially reduced in the aftermath 
of the sovereign debt crisis (see Table 2). Moreira et al. (2015, 205-212) identified no fewer than 76 labor 
reforms enacted during a period of three years alone (2010-13). Greece was ‘leading’ with 29 reforms, followed 
by Spain (22), Portugal (17) and Italy (8). Overall, these reforms targeted established socio-economic rights 
offering protection to workers both in and out of employment, especially households’ primary income earners. 
They included drastic reductions in the protection against individual and collective dismissals; extensive cuts in 
severance payments, in minimum wages and in the levels and duration of unemployment benefits; further 
erosion of protection for the temporary employed; and radical changes of national collective bargaining 
arrangements by means of formalizing decentralized, firm-based, bargaining (see also Bernaciak and Müller 
2013; Degryse et. al.,2013; Marginson, 2015). In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, Portugal introduced 
the most severe reductions in employment security for workers on permanent contracts while Spain reduced 
even further its already low employment protection (see Table 2 above). It is currently offering the lowest levels 
of employment security for those on regular contracts in southern Europe. Protection for temporary workers was 
also further weakened in Spain, Greece and Portugal, the latter replacing Italy as the country with the lowest 
level of employment protection for temporary workers in southern Europe.   
 
The impact of reforms was exacerbated by the austerity-induced recession and the already prevalent job 
polarization in southern European labor markets (Vaughan-Whitehead et al., 2016). With total unemployment at 
19% and youth unemployment at 46% (Eurostat, 2017) employment security in Spain has been further eroded 
by the long-term loss of traditional middle class jobs due to “new forms of precarious employment and the 
deterioration of core services of the welfare state” (Muñoz-De-Bustillo et al., 2016: 531). In Greece, the fall in 
domestic demand caused by the deepening of austerity-induced recession has resulted in the closure of hundreds 
of thousands of small and medium-sized businesses (author) that, traditionally, were the backbone of the Greek 
economy and employment. Having lost more than 25% of its GDP - “the biggest downturn to be experienced by 
an advanced western economy in peacetime” (The Guardian, 2017) - Greece is now experiencing the highest 
levels of total unemployment (24%) and youth unemployment (50%) in the EU (Eurostat, 2017). Italian 
unemployment is also considerably high, standing at 12%, while youth unemployment stands at 37% (Eurostat, 
2017). However, the substantial regional disparities between centre-north and south have led commentators to 
talk about the emergence of an ‘even more divided Italy’, ten years after the crisis (Brico, 2017:1). In their study 
                                                          
6 In fact Streeck (2015) goes as far as characterizing the whole process as the ‘rise of European 
Consolidation State’ (see also Feher, 2016). 
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of the erosion of Italian middle class Simonazzi and Barbieri (2016) concluded that, while wages have remained 
stagnant, many typical middle class jobs in Italy are either disappearing or have become extremely precarious. 
Similar labor market trends for the middle classes have been recorded in Portugal (Gonzalez et al., 2016) where 
by January 2017 total unemployment stood at 10% and youth unemployment at 25% (Eurostat, 2017).  
 
4.2 Inequality, income loss and the impact of austerity 
 
Austerity policies in southern Europe meant not only reductions in public expenditures, wages and pensions 
but also substantial increases in taxation, especially of those who Schäfer and Streeck (2013, 18) named as the 
‘immobile assets - i.e. consumers and low-income earners’. As can be seen in Figure 4 the combined impact of 
these measures was negative for all income groups of southern Europeans. All income deciles recorded losses of 
income over the period 2010-2015 and in all countries these losses hit disproportionately the very poor. 
However, when examined in more detail, the impact of austerity on middle classes’ incomes was not uniform 
across the region.  
 
Figure 4. Reductions in disposable income (%) by income decile groups in southern Europe, 
2010 -2015 
 
Note: Data for 10th decile not available 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat data (EU-SILC surveys)  
 
In Italy, losses in disposable income were very substantial for the lower income deciles (exceeding 9% for 
the 1st decile) than for the middle class ones (conventionally from 3rd up to 9th decile). This highlights the 
differential impact of austerity measures and corroborates Simonazzi and Barbieri’s (2016) findings of increased 
inequality in Italy during the crisis. In Greece, households witnessed massive income losses, from 35% 
upwards, in all income deciles as a result of wage and pension reductions and increased taxation especially on 
12 
 
small property. Although there appears to be minimal variation between the middle class deciles in terms of the 
relative size of the (large) losses, these seem to be smaller for the higher income deciles. In Spain, although 
overall losses were much lower in comparison to Greece, they appear to be more unequally distributed between 
deciles, with fewer losses for the higher income deciles, including the middle class ones. In Portugal, the picture 
is more varied, with much higher losses in the bottom two, sixth and ninth deciles. Our findings corroborate the 
results of other studies and reports on the impact of austerity on middle class incomes in Portugal (Gonzalez et 
al. 2016; Wise, 2015) which showed that a combination of wage cuts, tax increases, and longer working hours 
led to increased income inequality and substantial income losses among middle income groups.  
 
 
5. Concluding reflections: middle classes and the social politics of austerity 
 
Our article examined the position of middle classes in the reproduction of southern European welfare 
capitalisms in the light of the sovereign debt crisis. The evidence we analysed suggest that the process of middle 
class erosion, already underway prior to the crisis, accelerated in the aftermath of the crisis. The emergence of 
‘consolidation states’ (Streeck, 2015) in southern Europe destabilized further the security pillars of southern 
European welfare capitalisms (e.g. employment protection of family’s primary earner, home ownership and 
small property, adequate pensions). Combined with high unemployment (resulting from years of austerity-
induced recession), chronic job polarization, increasing inequality, and high private debt exposure, these 
processes have fundamentally undermined the traditional role of middle classes in the social reproduction of 
southern European welfare capitalisms.  
 
However, the transition to ‘consolidation states’ is not uniform, smooth or uncontested. As the negative 
impact of recession and austerity deepened (Verney and Bosco, 2013) political frustration found expression in a 
variety of forms and practices (Gerbaudo, 2017; Luengo, 2016). The rise of the radical left coalition of SYRIZA 
in power in Greece (but also the increase in electoral popularity of the neo-nazi ‘Golden Dawn’ party), the 
electoral successes of Podemos’ in Spain and the Five Star Movement-cum-party in Italy, shook the political 
status quo both domestically and in the EU. Even in Portugal, where mainstream parties still dominate the 
domestic political scene, support for the anti-austerity radical Left Bloc and the Communist Party rose 
exponentially since 2015 general elections. Indeed, southern European middle classes are becoming politically 
more polarized and electorally less ‘predictable’. Traditional electoral coalitions and party formations have 
either collapsed or are in crisis. At the same time the trustworthiness, if not outright legitimacy, of European and 
national institutions are severely challenged (Matthijs, 2014). The new social politics of austerity are radically 
transforming southern European regimes altering the size and role that middles classes historically played in 
their socio-political reproduction. Potentially, this can lead to a deeper contestation of the emergent European 
order of constitutionalized neo-liberalism (Gill, 2016, Roumpakis and Papadopoulos, 2017), with fundamental 
implications for the future of European Union itself.  
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